Nancy Safsten v. LDS Social Services Inc.; The Corporation of the Presiding Bisho of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and Does 1-30 : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Nancy Safsten v. LDS Social Services Inc.; The
Corporation of the Presiding Bisho of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and Does 1-30 :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard G. Hackwell; Attorney for Appellant.
David M. McConkie; Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton & McConkie; Attorneys for Aeppellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Safsten v. LDS Social Services, No. 960544 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/393
UTAH *'<"&, 
CJCOMENT 
K.'CJ 
50 
•A10 
DOCKET NO. Jt605Uq-fy\ 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
NANCY SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, Inc., 
a Utah Corporation; THE 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah Corporation; and 
DOES 1-30, 
Defendants and Appellees/ 
cross-appellants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 960544CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE 
KENNETH RIGTRUP PRESIDING, GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
DAVID M. McCONKIE (2154) 
MERRILL F. NELSON (3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
for defendants and appellees/ 
cross-appellants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
RICHARD G. HACKWELL (5075) 
for plaintiff and appellant 
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534 
Telephone: (801) 531-8300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420 
i 
Utah Court of Appeals 
APR - 8 1997 
vsariiyn M. Branch 
k of the Court 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
NANCY SAFSTEN, : 
: APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : 
vs. : 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, Inc., : 
a Utah Corporation; THE : 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING : 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS : 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, : No. 960544CA 
a Utah Corporation; and : 
DOES 1-30, : Priority No. 15 
Defendants and Appellees/ : 
cross-appellants. : 
APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE 
KENNETH RIGTRUP PRESIDING, GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
DAVID M. McCONKIE (2154) 
MERRILL F. NELSON (3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
for defendants and appellees/ 
cross-appellants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
RICHARD G. HACKWELL (5075) 
for plaintiff and appellant 
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534 
Telephone: (801) 531-8300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
ARGUMENT 4 
PLAINTIFF HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNTIL SHE 
DISCOVERED HER INCAPACITY 4 
A. Appellant behaved just as appellee's arguments and 
authorities would have her behave; in spite of 
reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not have 
discovered her causes of action until she discovered 
her incapacity 4 
B. Appellant had no claim, including for duress, 
until she discovered her flawed consent 9 
C. Appellees misstate the facts on appeal 
THERE ARE NO OTHER GROUNDS ON WHICH THE COURT 
MAY AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 12 
A. Laches does not bar appellant's claims 12 
B. The jury will determine whether defendants' conduct 
was sufficiently extreme 13 
C. Plaintiff could not and did not ratify the contract.. 14 
D. Plaintiff seeks appropriate equitable 
and legal relief 17 
. THE CROSS-APPEAL -- THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
PARAGRAPH 8 -- REGARDING APPELLEE'S MOTION 
REGARDING GLADYS S. CARLING' S AFFIDAVIT 19 
A. Background 2 0 
B. The District Court correctly ruled 
the issue is moot 22 
C. The motion fails on its merits; counsel may contact 
Gladys s. Carling as the rules otherwise allow 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
1 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. 
Authority Page 
Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Center. 
864 P.2d 921, 932 (Wash. 1993) 19 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.. 
920 P. 2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996) 4 
Aragon v. Clover Club Foods. 
857 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 7 
Beaman v. Martha Washington Mining Co. 
63 P. 631, 632-33 (Utah 1901) 18 
Berenda v. Lanaford. 914 P.2d 45, 53-55 (Utah 1996) 4, 7 
Borland v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987) 12 
Boyle v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.. 
866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993) 21 
Corbett v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 
71 P. 1065, 1067 (Utah 1903) 18 
Earthinfo v. Hydrosphere Resourse. 
900 P.2d 113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995) 17, 18 
Elk River Associates v. Huskin. 
691 P.2d 1148 (Colo. App. 1984) 14 
Ferguson v. Jeanes. 619 P.2d 369, 374 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) 16 
50 West Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency. 
784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989) 18 
2 
First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards. Inc.. 
653 P.2d 591, 597-98 (Utah 1982) 19 
Harden v. Harden. 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984) 17 
Granzow v. Village of Lyons. 89 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1937) ... 14 
Isenhower v. Isenhower. 666 P.2d 238, 241 
(Okl. App. 1983) 14 
Jones v. Carvell. 641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982) .... 18, 19 
Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards. Inc.. 
611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980) 19 
Larry C. Iverson. Inc. v. Bouma. 
639 P.2d 47, 60 (Mont. 1982) 14 
Osguthorpe v. Osauthorpe. 872 P.2d 1057, 1058 
(Utah App. 1994) 21 
Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Utah 1983) .... 16 
Romero v. J.W. Jones Construction Co.. 
651 P.2d 1302, 1306 (N.M. 1982) 14, 15 
Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961) 13 
Shearson Lehman Bros.. Inc. v. Wasatch Bank. 
139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991) 21, 22 
Ward v. Richard & Rossano, Inc.. P.S., 
754 P.2d 120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988) 14, 15 
3 
II. ARGUMENT. 
I. PLAINTIFF HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNTIL SHE DISCOVERED HER 
INCAPACITY. 
A. Appellant behaved just as appellee's arguments and 
authorities would have her behave; in spite of 
reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not have 
discovered her causes of action until she discovered 
her incapacity. 
Appellant behaved just as appellee's arguments and 
authorities would have her behave to toll the statutes of 
limitation. As appellees argue: 
The test for inquiry notice is whether the 
circumstances would suggest to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that a loss, injury or wrong had occurred. 
If so, the plaintiff must be reasonably diligent in 
investigating the facts surrounding the loss which 
forms the basis of her cause of action. 
Appellee's Brief pg. 13 (citing Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (limitation period postponed by belated 
discovery of key facts)). And if one on inquiry notice is 
reasonably diligent in investigating the facts surrounding the 
loss and still fails to discover the key facts which form the 
basis of her cause of action, the statute of limitations is 
tolled until she does. Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 53-55 
(Utah 1996). 
Here, because of her faith in the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (the Church) and its counsel, plaintiff was not 
on inquiry notice. But even if she was on inquiry notice, she 
diligently investigated the facts surrounding her loss and still 
4 
could not have discovered the facts forming the basis of her 
causes of action. 
The Church counseled appellant she would ruin the child's 
life if she did anything other than submit the child to Social 
Services for adoption placement. Appellant's Aff. ^4, Record on 
Appeal pg. 288. Appellant loves and trusts the Church and its 
offices. Appellant's Aff. 1(12, Record on Appeal pg. 289. When 
she recovered from her incapacitated state, she learned she had 
given her son to Social Services for adoption placement. She had 
no memory of signing the release. Appellant's Aff., exhibit G, 
Record on Appeal, pg. 3 02. She assumed she had succumbed to the 
Church's stern counsel and knowingly released her son to them for 
adoption. She was racked with sorrow and remorse, but if sorrow 
and remorse were the standard for inquiry notice, possibly every 
birth mother would have grounds to upset every adoption. 
Appellant's trust and confidence in the Church removed from 
her any suspicion that the Church acted wrongly in obtaining her 
consent. Appellant's Aff. 1(12, Record on Appeal pg. 289. Only 
years later when appellant discovered she had been drugged when 
she signed the release and discovered the release stated Social 
Service could place the child with a single parent did appellant 
realize she was incapacitated when Social Services took her 
release. Not until her shocking discovery of Social Services 
wrongdoing could appellant possibly have been on notice of her 
claims against appellees. 
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Appellees claim that appellant's knowledge she had lost her 
son equals knowledge of her injury and thus knowledge of her 
claims. Although appellant obviously was aware she had lost her 
son, she was completely unaware of the circumstances under which 
Social Services derived her flawed consent; she was completely 
unaware of the facts underlying her causes of action. But even 
if those facts should put her on notice as appellees claim, 
appellant made the diligent inquiry appellees would require of 
her. 
Appellant diligently attempted to discover why she had given 
her ostensible consent when all her will belied it. Appellant's 
Aff. 126, Record on Appeal pg. 291. For example, on January 18, 
1967, appellant and her mother visited Social Services to inquire 
about appellant's son and the adoption and to inform Social 
Services of appellant's sorrow, confusion and regret. Social 
Services failed to inform appellant of her incapacity and failed 
to provide any information about how it had obtained appellant's 
consent. Appellant's Aff. 127, Record on Appeal pg. 291. After 
January 18, 1967, appellant inquired of Social Services through 
its various agents approximately thirty more times about her son 
and the adoption. Social Services told appellant it could give 
her no other information regarding the adoption or her son. 
Appellant's Aff. ^28, Record on Appeal pg. 291-92. 
In spite of her dogged diligence in investigating the facts 
surrounding the loss, appellant still failed to discover the 
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facts which formed the basis of her cause of action. The statute 
of limitations was tolled until she did. Berenda v. Langford, 
914 P.2d 45, 53-55 (Utah 1996). The quality of appellant's 
diligence is a question of fact for the jury. Aragon v. Clover 
Club Foods, 857 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53-55 (Utah 1996). 
The District Court erroneously determined appellant could 
have obtained her medical records before she did. Record on 
Appeal, pg. 390. But appellant reasonably believed her records 
had been destroyed. Contrary to the facts as appellees present 
them, appellant did not understand Social Services would pay the 
costs of her confinement nor did she desire for Social Services 
to do so. Appellant asked the hospital to provide her with her 
records so she could pay for the costs she and her son had 
incurred. Appellant's Aff. fl3, Record on Appeal pg. 289. The 
hospital responded as follows: 
Since the records of our no information maternity 
patients are destroyed, I can only send you an 
estimated amount. 
Appellant's Aff. 1l4, Record on Appeal pg. 289. From the 
Hospital's reply, appellant reasonably assumed her records had 
been destroyed and she could have no access to them. Appellant's 
Aff. 1l5, Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
Over 23 years after the birth of her son, appellant and her 
son were reunited. Appellant's Aff. 116, Record on Appeal pg. 
289. Appellant desired to obtain her son's medical records and 
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requested them from the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990. 
Appellant's Aff. 1l7, Record on Appeal pg. 289. In response to 
appellant's request, on or about May 29, 1990, the Hospital gave 
her copies not of her son's records as she had requested but of 
her own records, which she reasonably had assumed were destroyed. 
Appellant's Aff. 1l8, Record on Appeal pg. 289. Appellant then 
learned for the first time she had been drugged with Thorazine 
during her entire Hospital stay. Appellant's Aff. 1l9, Record on 
Appeal pg. 290. 
Social Services never had given appellant a copy of the 
release. After she obtained her medical records, in or about 
August, 1990, appellant visited Social Services to determine what 
documentation, if any, Social Services had of the authority it 
claimed in placing appellant's son for adoption. Appellant then 
obtained from Social Services a copy of the release. Plaintiff's 
Aff. i[20, Record on Appeal pg. 290. By matching the release with 
her hospital records, appellant discovered for the first time 
Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while 
appellant was incapacitated from the effects of the drug 
Thorazine. Appellant later learned that Social Services was 
aware of appellant's sedation and affected condition when it 
obtained her consent. Plaintiff's Aff. ^20, Record on Appeal, 
pg. 290; Carling Aff. f1[6 & 9, Record on Appeal, pg. 308. 
Appellant was unaware of the facts underlying her claims. 
Appellant diligently inquired after her son; she conducted the 
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very inquiry appellees would ask of her. Appellant did not and 
could not have discovered the facts underlying her claims in 
spite of that diligent inquiry. The discovery rule applies to 
toll the applicable statutes of limitation. 
B. Appellant had no claim, including for duress, 
until she discovered her flawed consent. 
Appellees blithely confess appellant had a cause of action 
for duress unrelated to her incapacity which she should have 
prosecuted in 1967. Their ironic confession is false. Neither 
appellees nor any court of law would have recognized an action 
proved only by plaintiff's sorrow and remorse. Appellant had no 
cause of action until she discovered the key facts of Social 
Service's wrongdoing to support her causes of action. 
Acting for the Church, Social Services counseled appellant 
she would ruin her son's life if she kept him. When she realized 
Social Services had taken her son, appellant was grief-stricken 
and confused and inquired diligently about him. These are the 
facts appellees argue appellant was aware of which gave her an 
action for duress. Apparently, appellees argue that if appellant 
gave her consent based on the Church's stern counsel and later 
regretted her decision, she had an action for duress to upset the 
adoption. Let us hope for the Church that appellees are wrong, 
or every birth mother who gives her consent based on Church 
counsel and later feels sorrow and remorse may upset the adoption 
based on a claim of duress. 
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Although the Church's counsel may be shocking to some, it is 
hallowed doctrine to others. As the present facts prove, merely 
following that counsel would not support a claim for duress. All 
appellant's sorrow, confusion and remorse would not upset the 
transaction. Carling Aff. ^11, Record on Appeal, pg. 309. Until 
she discovered appellees took her consent while incapacitated she 
had no claim, including for duress. 
Appellees make a mockery of appellant's faith in the Church 
and its counsel. Appellant loves and trusts the Church and its 
offices. Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Her confidence in the Church and 
its offices defeated all suspicion that Social Services had acted 
wrongly in the transaction. Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Until she 
obtained her records totally by coincidence, she would not have 
dreamed Social Services would have availed itself of her 
incapacity. 
Appellant's failure to discover her claims sooner was not 
from a lack of diligence. She inquired of Social Services 
through its various agents over thirty times regarding the 
adoption and her consent. Social Services repeatedly told her it 
could give her no information regarding the adoption or her son. 
Carling Aff. Kll, Record on Appeal, pg. 309. She had no claim 
to bring until she learned she had given her consent while 
incapacitated. 
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation 
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the 
10 
legal cause of her injury. The date of her physical injury is 
irrelevant. Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she 
filed timely in May, 1993. 
C. Appellees misstate the facts on appeal. 
Appellant did not meet with Social Services to "discuss and 
plan the adoption prior to the birth.11 Appellees' Brief, pg. 3. 
Appellant sought religious counsel from the Church's Relief 
Society, Social Services' predecessor in interest, which she 
assumed would respect her confidence and act in her best 
interest. Appellant's Aff. <[4, Record on Appeal pg. 2 88. She 
did not understand she was seeking that counsel from an adoption 
agency with numerous conflicts of interest. The Relief Society 
employee who counseled appellant and later took her consent 
freely admits appellant had not determined to give the child for 
adoption during their counseling. Carling Aff. %3, Record on 
Appeal pg. 308. Nor did appellees take appellant's consent at 
her request, as appellees misstate. Appellees' Brief, pg. 23. 
When Social Services took appellant's consent appellant was so 
incapacitated she was fainting and had no recollection of the 
event. Appellant's Aff. %8, Record on Appeal pg. 288; 
Appellant's Aff. exhibit G, Record on Appeal, pg. 304. And 
appellant did not assume Social Services would pay for her 
confinement, nor did she desire for them to do so. Appellant 
made a special effort to pay the bill herself. Appellant's Aff. 
1l3, Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
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II. THERE ARE NO OTHER GROUNDS ON WHICH THE COURT MAY AFFIRM THE 
DISTRICT COURTS RULING. 
A. Laches does not bar appellant's claims. 
Laches would require appellees to prove "both that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the 
defendant[s were] prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). Here, as argued fully 
above and in appellants primary brief, appellant reasonably 
could not have brought her claims sooner. Her claims accrued 
about August, 1990. Once those claims accrued plaintiff asserted 
them immediately and tenaciously. And, as in Borland, defendants 
have failed to show any prejudice. 
In Borland, the defendant made no factual showing to support 
his arguments that because of the time lapse between the subject 
events and plaintiff's claim, he was unable to contact witnesses 
and gather documents. Borland, 733 P.2d at 147. Here, 
defendants' similar arguments are unsupported by and contrary to 
the uncontroverted facts. Plaintiff and Gladys S. Carling were 
the only witnesses to the transaction. Mrs. Carling recalls the 
transaction remarkably clearly. Mrs. Carling also made a 
contemporaneous record of her impressions regarding the 
transaction. Carling Aff. ^8-9; Record on Appeal pg. 308. 
Appellees' argument that their records have been lost or 
destroyed is unsupported by affidavit and contrary to the facts 
at hand. Appellees' laches claim must fail. 
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B. The jury will determine whether defendants' conduct 
was sufficiently extreme. 
The question of whether appellees' conduct was extreme and 
outrageous is a fact questions for the jury. The jury will 
determine whether it was extreme and outrageous for appellees to 
take appellant first born son for adoption, without her knowing 
consent, during a time of severe emotional and spiritual turmoil, 
while she trusted her beloved Church to protect her from the very 
type of harm she suffered at its hand. Samms v. Eccles, 358 
P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961) . 
Appellees did not take appellant's consent at her request, 
as appellees misstate. Appellees' Brief, pg. 23. Appellant 
sought religious counsel from the Church's Relief Society, Social 
Services' predecessor in interest, which she assumed would 
respect her confidence and act in her best interest. She did not 
understand she was seeking that counsel from an adoption agency 
with numerous conflicts of interest. The Relief Society employee 
who counseled appellant and later took her consent freely admits 
appellant had not determined to give the child for adoption when 
entered the hospital. And appellant did not assume Social 
Services would pay for her confinement, nor did she desire for 
them to do so. Appellant made a special effort to pay the bill 
herself. 
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C. Plaintiff could not and did not ratify the contract. 
1. A contract ostensibly entered without capacity is 
no contract at all and cannot be ratified. 
"It has been held that a contract entered into without the 
power to contract cannot be ratified or enforced and that the 
incapacity to contract cannot be removed by estoppel." Larry C, 
Iverson, Inc. v. Bouma, 639 P.2d 47, 60 (Mont. 1982) citing 
Granzow v. Village of Lyons, 89 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1937). "A void 
contract is no contract at all; it binds no one and is a mere 
nullity." Isenhower v. Isenhower, 666 P.2d 238, 241 (Okl. App. 
1983). "Being void the transaction could not be confirmed, 
ratified, enforced or rendered enforceable by the application of 
any doctrine of estoppel or otherwise." Granzow v. Village of 
Lyons. 89 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1937) 
Here, plaintiff lacked the capacity to contract. No 
contract was ever formed with plaintiff which plaintiff later 
could ratify. The release on which defendants rely is void. 
2. Ratification must be with full knowledge. 
"It is indispensable to ratification that the party held 
thereto shall have had full knowledge of all the material facts 
concerning the transaction." Romero v. J.W. Jones Construction 
Co.. 651 P.2d 1302, 1306 (N.M. 1982); See also. Elk River 
Associates v. Huskin, 691 P.2d 1148 (Colo. App. 1984) (to ratify 
party must have full knowledge of the truth regarding the 
transaction); Ward v. Richard & Rossano, Inc., P.S.. 754 P.2d 
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120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988)(can only ratify after discovery of the 
facts which would warrant rescission). 
Here, appellant had no knowledge or notice of the legal 
cause of her injury. She knew she was grief stricken and confused 
as to why she allowed the adoption but she was not aware of what 
made it void, i.e., her Thorazine induced incapacity. Plaintiff 
had no knowledge or notice of the choice defendants claim she had 
to nullify or ratify the void release on which they rely. 
3. Ratification must be with specific intent. 
"The mere passage of time does not necessarily establish 
ratification." Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., P.S., 754 P.2d 
120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988). "After possessing the requisite 
knowledge, the person sought to be held to a ratification must 
act with the intention of ratifying the voidable transaction." 
Romero, 651 P.2d at 1306. Plaintiff was never aware of the 
choice she had to void the contract. She was never aware she 
possessed the legal ground on which to do so. Without that 
awareness, she could not intentionally forego that choice and 
ratify the contract. Perhaps the strongest evidence of that is 
her reaction to learning the facts making the contract void. She 
immediately and vehemently denied the void contract. 
4. Undue influence in the transaction is presumed to 
maintain and taint the possibility of subsequent 
ratification. 
"In ratification cases where undue influence tainted the 
execution of a trust, will, or contract, it is presumed that the 
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undue influence also tainted the ratification if the causative 
elements giving rise to the initial undue influence are such that 
the undue influence was likely to have continued." Robertson v. 
Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Utah 1983). For example, in 
Ferguson v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), a 
religious leader persuaded one of his devotee's to give him money 
to form a partnership with him. The leader failed to pay her as 
agreed but continually reassured her the payments would be 
forthcoming. The devotee trusted the leader's assurances so she 
delayed to investigate her possible legal rights against the 
leader. The court found the devotee's agreement was caused by 
the leader's undue influence achieved in the name of the 
religion. The same trust and confidence which caused the devotee 
first to enter the contract also caused her delay in pursuing her 
legal rights. Ferguson, 619 P.2d at 374. Her delay did not 
ratify the contract. 
Here, appellant had trust and confidence in Social Services 
as an agent of the church to which she was and remains devoted. 
Although she was hurt and confused, her faith in the Church 
removed any suspicion of wrongdoing. It never would have 
occurred to her that her Church would avail itself of her 
incapacity. Social Services' extraordinary influence overcame 
the instinct she otherwise would have had to inquire into any 
wrongdoing. That influence never waned. She did not and could 
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not know of her remedy until fate gave her knowledge of her 
claims. 
D. Plaintiff seeks appropriate equitable and legal relief. 
Appellees erroneously assert this Court may affirm the 
District Court's ruling dismissing appellant's claims because 
appellant seeks emotional distress damages inappropriately. To 
the contrary, appellant seeks legal and equitable relief as 
appropriate to each of her causes of action. 
1. In contract/ equity will allow the Court to return 
the parties to their precontract position; 
when restitution is impractical or 
impossible, damages will substitute. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to rescind this void contract 
and return the parties to their pre-contract position. Harden v. 
Harden, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984)(purpose of equity action is 
to restore the parties to the status quo ante to the extent 
possible). "The rule of returning the parties to the status quo 
ante is equitable and it requires the use of practicality in the 
readjustment of the parties7 rights." Earthinfo v. Hydrosphere 
Resourse, 900 P.2d 113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995). "Since rescission 
is an equitable remedy, it is within the trial court's sound 
discretion to determine the method for accomplishing a return to 
the status quo ante based upon the facts as determined by the 
trier of fact." Id. 
Here, plaintiff's precontract position was as the mother of 
a healthy baby boy, set to enjoy all the incidental benefits of 
17 
that relationship, including the economic benefits to be derived 
and the love and companionship inherent in the mother, son 
relationship. The Court cannot reverse time and physically 
restore plaintiff's son to her. But damages may provide a 
sufficient remedy when restitution is impossible. 50 West 
Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171. The Court 
can restore to plaintiff the economic value of her lost rights. 
See Earthinfo, 900 P.2d at 118-19 (court ordered return of 
computer software and all proceeds and technology derived from 
it) . 
The loss one suffers from the wrongful death of a minor 
child is a perfect analogy. Utah recognizes that loss of a minor 
child includes the loss of the services, love and companionship, 
care and support the plaintiff would have had from the child. 
Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982); Corbett v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 71 P. 1065, 1067 (Utah 1903); Beaman v. 
Martha Washington Mining Co., 63 P. 631, 632-33 (Utah 1901). 
2. In tort, plaintiff seeks to recover damages which 
are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
defendants' tortious conduct. 
Appellant seeks to recover only for the direct injury to her 
caused by defendants' tortious conduct. See Jones v. Carvell, 
641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982). She does not seek to recover 
for any loss to her caused by injury to another, such as in an 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress as 
appellees would misconstrue her claims. And although 
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compensation for mental pain and suffering is always allowed when 
caused by a direct injury to that plaintiff, Judd v. Rowley's 
Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980); See 
First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 
591, 597-98 (Utah 1982)(mental anguish damages allowed in case of 
bank's wrongful attachment of assets), that is not the crux of 
plaintiff's damage claims. 
Here, the damages which are the reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of defendants' tortious conduct are the loss of the 
services, love and companionship of her first born child and the 
torment and anguish which accompanied that loss. See Jones v. 
Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982); See also Adcox v. 
Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Center, 864 P.2d 921, 932 
(Wash. 1993) ($1.2 million medical injury award for destroying 
significant aspects of the mother-child relationship). That is 
what plaintiff is entitled to and that is all that she claims. 
III. THE CROSS-APPEAL -- THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
PARAGRAPH 8 -- REGARDING APPELLEE'S MOTION REGARDING 
GLADYS S. CARLING'S AFFIDAVIT. 
Appellees cross-appeal from paragraph 8 of the summary 
judgment order in which the District Court ruled: 
8. With the granting of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, defendants' separate Motion for Protective 
Order, Sanctions and to Quash Subpoena is rendered 
moot. 
Record on Appeal, pg. 370. 
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The District Court ruled only that appellees' motion was 
moot; the District Court did not rule on the motion's merits. 
That is the only order from which appellees may appeal. 
Regardless, the motion also fails on its merits. 
A. Background. 
Gladys S. Carling is not a defendant as appellees 
erroneously assert. She is a former employee of the Church's 
Relief Society, predecessor in interest to defendant Social 
Services. Carling Aff. [^ A. Record on Appeal pg. 306. It is 
undisputed that Mrs. Carling left the Relief Society's employ 24 
years ago. 
B. The District Court correctly ruled the issue is moot. 
A case is moot when the relief requested cannot affect the 
litigants' rights. Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057, 1058 
(Utah App. 1994) . A claim is unripe for consideration "where 
there exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the 
hypothetical application of [the rule] to a situation in which 
the parties might, at some future time, find themselves..." 
Boyle v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.. 866 P.2d 595, 598 
(Utah App. 1993) . Here, appellees' motion is moot as it appears 
in this Court. If this Court upholds the trial court's ruling, 
appellants claims will be dismissed and there will be no more 
justiciable controversy among the parties on the subject. Mrs. 
Carling's affidavit and any further contact with her will be 
without effect. If this Court upsets the trial court ruling and 
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remands the matter for further hearing, the trial court can 
consider and rule on appellees' motion as the need arises, 
C. The motion fails on its merits; counsel may contact 
Gladys s. Carling as the rules otherwise allow. 
Utah Code of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 does not apply to 
former employees. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 
139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991)(interpreting the Utah State rule). 
In 1991, the American Bar Association, Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, issued the following formal opinion 
which the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
specifically applied to the Utah rule: 
While the committee recognizes that persuasive 
policy arguments can be and have been made for 
extending the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some 
former corporate employers, (sic) the fact remains that 
the text of the Rule does not do so and the comment 
gives no basis for concluding that such coverage was 
intended. Especially where, as here, the effect of the 
Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of information about 
one's case, the Committee is loath, given the text of 
Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to expand its coverage 
to former employees by means of liberal interpretation. 
Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Committee 
that a lawyer representing a client in a matter adverse 
to a corporate party that is represented by another 
lawyer may, without violating Model Rule 4.2, 
communicate about the subject of the representation 
with an unrepresented former employee of the corporate 
party without the consent of the corporation's lawyer. 
Shearson, 139 F.R.D. at 417. 
Only employees whose present conduct can be imputed to the 
corporate defendant are considered imputable parties to the 
litigation with whom opposing counsel may have no ex parte 
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contact. Shearson, 139 F.R.D. at 417. The rule does not apply 
to former employees. Id. Here, Mrs. Carling has not been an 
employee of Social Services for 24 years. Counsel's contacts 
with her are allowed and appropriate. 
Plaintiff's counsel first contacted Mrs. Carling on April 8, 
1996. Hackwell Aff. ^3; Record on Appeal, pg. 347. Mrs. Carling 
did not ask if she was a "Doe" defendant. Hackwell Aff. i|4; 
Record on Appeal, pg. 347. She asked if she was being sued and 
plaintiff's counsel instructed her she was not. Id. Counsel 
explained to Mrs. Carling she was a witness in the case and could 
talk to counsel or not, as she desired. Hackwell Aff. 15; Record 
on Appeal, pg. 348. Mrs. Carling stated her willingness to talk 
with plaintiff's counsel and to testify if she were subpoenaed 
for that purpose. Hackwell Aff. 1(6; Record on Appeal, pg. 348. 
Counsel informed Mrs. Carling plaintiff required an affidavit to 
support plaintiff's opposition to defendants' summary judgment. 
Hackwell Aff. \l-, Record on Appeal, pg. 348. Mrs. Carling 
stated she would give her affidavit. 
Mrs. Carling informed counsel she had been contacted and 
interviewed by Mr. Nelson. Hackwell Aff. 1|8; Record on Appeal, 
pg. 348. She did not inform plaintiff's counsel Mr. Nelson 
represented her because that was not the case. Hackwell Aff. 1(8/ 
Record on Appeal, pg. 348. She stated Mr. Nelson asked if 
plaintiff's counsel had contacted her. Hackwell Aff. i|9; Record 
on Appeal, pg. 348. And, as was accurate at the time, Mrs. 
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Carling told Mr. Nelson plaintiff's counsel had not contacted 
her. Hackwell Aff. i[9; Record on Appeal, pg. 348. Mr. Nelson 
did not instruct her not to speak with plaintiff's counsel. Nor 
could he, because Mrs. Carling is not a defendant and is not 
represented by Mr. Nelson or Kirton & McConkie. As is clear from 
the affidavit which defendants' counsel prepared for Mrs. 
Carling, when Mr. Nelson interviewed Mrs. Carling last 
Fall he instructed her he represented the defendants. Carling 
Second Aff. 14; Record on Appeal, pg. 325. He did not instruct 
her he represented her as a party to the lawsuit. 
When Mrs. Carling met with appellees' counsel, Merrill F. 
Nelson, she engaged her own counsel to accompany her. 
Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. %^ 1 & 2; Record on Appeal, pg. 344. She 
stated did not understand what Mr. Nelson had meant by "D.O.E" 
defendant. Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 15; Record on Appeal, pg. 
344. She stated emphatically to Mr. Nelson he had not informed 
her she was part of the defense. Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. %1; 
Record on Appeal, pg. 345. She stated emphatically to Mr. Nelson 
that never once had she told Mr. Nelson she would be any part of 
the defense. Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 1(8/ Record on Appeal, pg. 
345. She stated emphatically to Mr. Nelson she would not sign an 
affidavit saying she was part of the defense. Plaintiff's Supp. 
Aff. %9; Record on Appeal, pg. 345. Mr. Nelson became irate, 
threw papers he had prepared to the ground and stated this had 
destroyed his day. Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 1l0; Record on 
23 
Appeal, pg. 345. She felt Mr. Nelson was trying to scare her and 
made her believe if the defendants lost the case they would come 
after her. Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. fll; Record on Appeal, pg. 
345. She stated Mr. Nelson attempted to twist her meaning. 
Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 16; Record on Appeal, pg. 345. Finally, 
Mrs. Carling's counsel instructed her to sign Mr. Nelson's draft 
of the affidavit to get it over with and explain and clarify the 
affidavit later. Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 1l2; Record on Appeal, 
pg. 345. 
Mrs. Carling is an important witness to this lawsuit. She 
will not be a party to this lawsuit unless appellees make her 
one. Until she is made a party, or until she engages counsel, 
plaintiff's counsel may contact Mrs. Carling as he desires. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
Social Services obtained appellant's release when it knew or 
should have known appellant lacked the capacity to give it. By 
her continuing trust and confidence in the Church, appellant 
lacked all suspicion the Church or its offices had acted wrongly. 
But she was aware she had lost her son and was aware of her 
sorrow and remorse, so she diligently inquired regarding her 
loss. Appellees shunned her many inquiries. Appellant 
reasonably believed her medical records had been destroyed. In 
spite of her diligent inquiry, she did not and could not have 
discovered the key facts of her causes of action until fate 
revealed them to her. The District Court erred in paragraphs 2 
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through 7 of its order granting appellees7 motion for summary 
judgment and appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
that error. 
The District Court correctly ruled that appellees' motion 
regarding Mrs. Carling's affidavit is moot. Even so, the motion 
fails on its merits. Utah's Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 
does not apply to former employees of institutional defendants. 
The rule prevents only contact with present employees whose 
present conduct is imputable to the defendant. Appellees motion 
has no merit or effect, in this or the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted on April 8, 1997. 
krd G. Hackwell 
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